Johnson v. Lehman by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-7-2008 
Johnson v. Lehman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"Johnson v. Lehman" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 401. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/401 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-2683
_____________
RONALD JOHNSON,
  Appellant
   v.
JOSEPH D. LEHMAN; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY,
                               Appellees
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 94-cv-07583)
District Judge: Honorable Norma L. Shapiro 
____________
 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on September 12, 2008
____________
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 7, 2008 ) 
                      
OPINION 
                      
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
2Ronald Johnson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, contending that the assistance of his counsel was ineffective during his
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania murder trial, at which Johnson was convicted of murder
of the first degree, criminal conspiracy and possession of an instrument of crime.        
Specifically, Johnson argues that his trial attorney failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation and failed to present the testimony of two witnesses who would have
corroborated Johnson’s alibi defense. A Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending
denial and dismissal of Johnson’s petition, determining that although Johnson’s trial
counsel representation was deficient, trial counsel’s performance was not prejudicial to
Johnson because a reasonable jury would not have determined that he was not guilty,
even with the supporting testimony of the two uncalled witnesses. The District Court
approved and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, as
supplemented by its memorandum, and issued an order denying and dismissing Johnson’s
petition. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties who are familiar with the facts and
proceedings in the District Court, we need only briefly recite the facts. The testimony at
trial established that the victim, Joseph Goldsby, who was selling crack cocaine, was shot
and killed on March 1, 1990. Johnson approached the victim’s car with an unknown male
and female and engaged the victim in drug-related conversation. Two eyewitnesses to the
3incident, Darryl Alexander and Mark Jackson, testified that they knew Johnson and
detailed his involvement in the murder. Jackson also testified that Johnson approached
him several days after the murder and told him to “be careful what you say.” 
Johnson testified and called Richard Duncan as a witness to establish an alibi
defense. Johnson and Duncan testified that they were away from the scene of the crime,
that they were in a car getting high on narcotics and were unaware of Goldsby’s murder
until they were so advised by a man named James Smith, also known as “Seed.”
Robin Johnson and Derrick Holmes, two additional witnesses present at the scene
of the murder, gave statements to the police shortly after the date of the crime. Appellant
Johnson’s trial counsel reviewed these statements, but did not interview Robin Johnson or
Holmes and did not call them as witnesses at trial. The crux of Johnson’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is that the testimony of Robin Johnson and Holmes would
have supported his alibi defense, and that it was unreasonable and prejudicial for
Johnson’s trial counsel to fail to interview and call these two witnesses after reviewing
their police statements. 
 We are to decide the sole issue of whether Johnson was denied competent counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his lawyer failed to interview or call Derrick
Holmes and Robin Johnson, two eyewitnesses who would have supported Johnson’s alibi
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court has1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253. Johnson’s federal habeas petition was
pending prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), so this case must be decided by the law as it existed before AEDPA
became effective. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-323 (1997); Buehl v. Vaughn,
166 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1999). Under pre-AEDPA law, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims present mixed questions of law and fact. Buehl, 166 F.3d at 169. State
court findings of fact are presumed correct if they are fairly supported by the record, but
whether counsel was effective is subject to de novo review. Id.
4
defense at his murder trial.    1
II.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court set forth a two-prong
test that a petitioner must satisfy before a court will find that counsel did not provide
effective assistance. Under Strickland, a petitioner must show (1) that his attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there exists
a reasonable probability that, barring counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687.
The Magistrate Judge and the District Court determined that a reasonable jury
would not have determined that Johnson was not guilty, even with the supporting
testimony of Robin Johnson and Derrick Holmes. We agree. Even if Johnson’s trial
counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, his deficiency did not
prejudice Johnson. Id. 
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
5would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Id.  The Magistrate Judge 
noted that the evidence against Johnson was not overwhelming, because the testimony of
the Commonwealth’s two main eyewitnesses, Darryl Alexander and Mark Jackson, was
contradicted by their earlier police statements that they could not identify the culprits in
the victim’s shooting. But Johnson’s alibi was not fully credible either. Although the
testimony of Robin Johnson and Derrick Holmes would have furnished some support of
Johnson’s alibi defense, we agree with the District Court that there is no reasonable
probability that their testimony would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jurors. Two eyewitnesses to the incident–Alexander and Jackson–testified that they knew
Johnson and described in specific detail Johnson’s involvement in the murder. 
Neither Robin Johnson nor Derrick Holmes were eyewitnesses to the shooting.
Neither provided Johnson with an affirmative alibi, as did Duncan, the defense witness
called at trial. Rather, the testimony of Holmes and Robin Johnson merely would have
established that they did not see Johnson while they were present buying drugs. At trial,
the Commonwealth came forth with eyewitnesses to the killing who specifically saw
Johnson standing outside the victim’s car in the process of attempting to fire his gun at
the victim. No witnesses came forward to allege that the person attempting to fire his gun
in this matter was someone other than Johnson. At best, the testimony of Holmes and
Robin Johnson would show that they did not see Johnson in the brief time they were
6there. In view of the detailed eyewitness testimony to the crime presented at trial, such
testimony does not create a reasonable probability that the jury would have doubted its
guilty verdict. 
******
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
